Abstract
Introduction
Before 1992, the Council of Ministers was known as a secretive, diplomacy-based decision making institution.
2 Sometimes, decisions remained wholly unpublicised, and citizens had no right of access to documents. Since then a process of change was brought about in the Council's transparency policies, significantly expanding access to documents and meetings. 3 This resulted in the adoption in 2001 of Regulation 1049 on the public's right of access to documents, both administrative and legislative, and caused an 'inexorable rise' of documentary transparency. 45 The increase in Council transparency was presented as a necessary development to balance the Council's growing role as a supranational legislative and executive power.
In the light of its pre-1992 track record of secrecy, the "transparency shift" that took place in the Council is remarkable. At the date of its introduction, most member states had hardly any experience and little affinity with transparency. Today, the Council has arguably become more transparent than many of its member states. Given the diplomatic culture that traditionally characterised the Council, and the reluctance of member states to open up its deliberations, the question how this important development can be explained remains to be answered.
In recent years, however, a retrenchment has taken place in the Council. Being 'far from a 'marginal' political dossier', the recast of Regulation 1049/2001 has attracted considerable political attention. 6 With the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, a central objective of the on-going revision procedure has become to align the regulation with its requirements; 7 however, certain member states have used it to re-evaluate the status quo and to advocate a revised law that gives greater weight to other values such as privacy and effective decision-making. A Council minority, led by Sweden, does not tolerate a reform outcome that 'rolls back' the existing arrangements. 8 With two groups of member states advocating change in opposite directions, the process has stagnated and eventually led to a This article seeks to address these three questions through the lens of an institutional analysis of policy change and policy stability. Institutional theory aims to contribute to our understanding of the workings of the Council in general and its transparency policies in particular. Our framework takes the member states and the Council as separate actors and we investigate their preferences and (power) resources, while paying attention to catalysts of change and social structures which shape the Council's interaction with supranational institutional actors such as the EP, the Commission, and the Court of Justice (ECJ). We realise that a sophisticated understanding of these dynamics also requires an analysis of the role of non-state actors at the national and supranational level, such as corporate lobbyists, NGOs, etc.; 9 however, such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, we believe that this omission has only limited consequences for our analysis as formal powers to adopt and interpret rules on transparency policies reside exclusively with the Council, the EP, and the ECJ. The present study should be regarded as contributing to our understanding of policy changes by focusing on the dynamics of intergovernmentalism in the EU context.
Further work is needed to understand the role of non-state actors in these policy changes and policy stabilities. 
Three dimensions of transparency policies
In recent years, transparency in governance has attracted increasing attention among various academic disciplines.
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The worldwide proliferation of transparency provisions in administration has led to an interesting debate on the nature of transparency, and its pros and cons in the context of the EU. This debate has developed along three central dimensions that may be described as the definitional, the ethical, and the implemental. A careful consideration of these three dimensions allows them to be applied as a benchmark in an empirical analysis of Council transparency.
The definitional dimension asks the question: what is transparency? In abstraction, transparency has been described simply as 'making the invisible visible', implying that phenomena are not self-evidently transparent; instead, an agent is needed to create transparency. 12 Moreover, it will also inherently be directed towards something, and as such we can speak of the "transparency of...". 13 This article focuses on government transparency policies, which is here defined as rules enabling the public to monitor processes taking place in a public body. 10 The empirical analysis is based on 238 primary documents (mainly policy documents) derived from FOI requests in four countries and with the Council, 55 secondary documents (mainly media reports) from over ten countries, and 9 interviews held with experts and member state representatives. Positions produced by the Council and member states are included as primary documents. This includes: documents submitted by member states to the Council, internal memoranda, email contact with the researcher, statements in the news media, press communiqués, speeches by state representatives, internal Council documents, and common standpoints. A total of 238 documents were analysed. Critics identify inherent tensions between transparency and privacy, effective decisionmaking, national autonomy and efficient administration, which leads to arguments that administrations must strive for optimal rather than maximal transparency. 19 Finally, there is the implemental dimension: how is transparency best put into practice? Researchers have focused on empirical assessments of its effects in the light of political, legal and organisational considerations. 20 Others have investigated the empirical relation between transparency and public values such as trust and accountability. 21 The debate focuses on whether and to what extent organisations need to adapt to make transparency provisions succeed. Advocates argue for a broad application of transparency and the need for a "culture shift". In contrast, sceptics advocate a limited, "realistic" application with more attention for perverse effects and costs.
Table 1 provides a conceptual overview of both pro-transparency and transparencysceptic views along the three dimensions. 
An institutional explanation of evolving Council transparency
In order to explain developments in Council transparency policies, institutional theory is taken as the analytical starting point. March and Olsen emphasise that institutional theory characterises politics in a more integrative fashion than rational actor models. 22 Central is the question how processes of change and stasis in institutional settings can be explained against the background of historically constructed identities and sets of (informal) rules for interaction. This applies well to the Council's transparency policies, where periods of stability have alternated with periods of change. Different strands of institutional theory have emphasised the ways in which regulative, normative and cognitive patterns help to explain developments in institutional contexts. 23 These approaches, despite laying different accents, often complement each other well. 24 We build upon various institutional approaches to develop a theoretical framework that focuses on actor preferences and power on the one hand and catalysts on the other. This approach will be used to develop propositions regarding the development and stasis of the transparency policies of the Council.
Preferences and power
For any change to be considered, actors require preferences. Our institutional approach takes as a starting point that 'public policies […] can be conceptualized in the same manner as belief systems, i.e. as sets of value priorities and causal assumptions about how to realize them'. 25 Consequently, beliefs both motivate and justify preferences. Convergent preferences, moreover, are seen as a major determinant of coalition formation. In terms of power, it must be noted that throughout the period under consideration, the coalition of pro-transparency countries formed a minority. Although consensus behaviour and minority blocking power may explain why, particularly during the current deadlock, transparency did not decrease, the question remains how the pro-transparency minority was able to proactively promote transparency policies. 31 An explanation is sought in persuasive power, and particularly the way in which the issue of transparency has been represented.
Representation in policy-making has long been recognised as a form of power in its own right. 32 In the case of policy areas with strong moral undertones, such as transparency, coalitions may use their arguments as a stick with which to beat their opponents. It is likely that particularly pro-transparent countries were best able to use persuasive power, which is reflected in the notable shift from no transparency to extensive transparency.
External catalysts
Preference and power appear to provide a strong explanation for the distribution of positions;
however, beyond a point of minimal development, they explain stasis better than policy 
Social structures
In contrast to catalysts, a number of "stable factors" may be expected to provide the parameters within which a policy area is embedded: social structures. Social structures act as it were, as anti-catalysts. 38 Institutional theory hypothesises that constitutional structures (such as the European treaties) and fundamental social structures (such as habitual interinstitutional interaction) that provide the normative framework in which policy making occurs, are rigid and extremely slow to change. 39 The framework of the treaties and inter-institutional relations would tend to stabilize transparency provisions after a policy is decided on.
However, the literature on EU transparency generally comes to the opposite conclusion. A frequently noted characteristic of the EU is its dynamic constitutional context, which leads its social structures to be considerably less rigid than those in national contexts. 40 Observers have held that frequent treaty changes in fact tend to accelerate policy development; others in turn point at vast differences in preference among the institutions when it comes to the transparency dossier. 41 Rather than taking aspects of social structure such as treaties and inter-institutional relations for granted as anti-catalysts, they should on the contrary not be overlooked as potential catalysts of change. Before the IGC, preference-based coalitions were therefore largely absent in the area of transparency. This renders the question of power resources obsolete, since these are only employed where actors discern policy issues and have preferences about them: 'no agenda attention for an issue is the best guarantee that the status quo will be maintained'.
Analysis of member
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A catalyst for the introduction of transparency provisions seemed equally absent:
despite the EP's calls for more openness, the Council worked under a consensus-based modus operandi that was widely accepted among its members, meaning that Council legislation followed the norms of diplomatic negotiations. However, two countries with a national transparency tradition, the Netherlands and Denmark, considered that the manner in which the Council was evolving, both in law and in practices as a supranational (legislative) actor in a political union, required more democratic legitimation than was hitherto the case when its role could be considered only in intergovernmental terms. The 1991 IGC and the Dutch presidency placed this issue squarely on the agenda.
After 1992: increase in formal transparency
From Maastricht to Amsterdam
The first Council member to express a preference for increasing European transparency was the Netherlands. In January 1991, it proposed a specific treaty amendment. The Netherlands was just concluding a revision process of its own Law on Administrative Openness as it assumed the presidency in July of that year. A preference based on national policy, power based on expertise derived from twelve years of legislative experience and the presidency, and a catalyst in the treaty negotiations converged in the Netherlands. Although a treaty article on transparency lacked sufficient support, a compromise gave the presidency a token Although it left open substantial legal ambiguity, a strong consensus existed within the Council to depoliticise the matter and let it develop further in practice. Council on procedural grounds, 75 an opinion that was echoed by the Commission after the EP formally adopted a revised report in December 2011. 76 In February 2012 however the Council reluctantly re-started negotiations on a common position. In line with past practice, it categorically declined to disclose the content of these negotiations while the legislative process is on-going. 77 In terms of preference and power, ample evidence exists that the member state preferences continue to be largely informed by their administrative cultures. However, the divide which previously marked the policy debate became even more polarised under the revision procedure. The progressive clarification of Regulation 1049/2001 by the courts has rendered it more difficult for a Council majority to accept this regulation as a starting point.
The argumentative style and content, voting patterns and court interventions of a number of Council members confirm the continuing existence of a minority pro-transparency coalition. This group includes the Netherlands while Sweden is its most active and visible champion. It insists that the revision should 'lead to increased openness and nothing else'.
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The pro-transparency coalition finds sustained and persistent support from an EP majority, the Ombudsman, and civil society.
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Previous to the current recast procedure, a transparency-sceptic coalition was harder to discern for outsiders. This may be due either to the fact that since this position was shared by a majority, there was less need to form alliances, or because no member state dared to publicly oppose increasing transparency. Nonetheless, a trend reversal is discernible in The above analysis leads lends itself to speculation about the future of transparency policies in the Council. One possibility is that stasis ensues. Policy preferences continue to be divergent, and all actors have sufficient resources to block any unwanted outcome. Actors are unwilling to compromise, and given that legislation is already in place, the status quo is preferred to any of the change options. The revision procedure is deemed an insufficient catalyst for change. This scenario of stasis constitutes the path of compromise, but it will prove hard to maintain, due to changing social structures within the EU.
In another possible scenario, change is obstructed by the polarisation of preferences.
The permissive atmosphere from which the pro-transparency coalition long derived its power has declined, although the steady institutionalisation of Council policies means that it has the means to defend the status quo. In particular, changes in the social structures over the past decades have led to a supranational bias. More than before, Council members are dependent on the position of actors such as the EP, the ECJ, and the Ombudsman. Due to changes contained in the Lisbon Treaty, this makes it less unlikely that Council transparency policies will continue to develop. However, such change is expected to be increasingly shaped by supranational institutional actors.
Conclusion: Transparency in a deadlock?
Over the past two decades, the Council has implemented multi-faceted transparency policies.
Starting from a situation of no formal provisions before 1992, pro-transparent member states However, within the EU, the Council as a supranational actor is not an island.
Increasingly often, it has to take into account the views of supranational actors such as the Ombudsman, the European courts, and, particularly in the legislative process, the EP, which has consequences even for its internal transparency policies. While within the Council tolerance towards transparency is declining, and a majority has formed in favour of a more grown over time. Council decision-making takes place within a context of on-going dynamic constitutionalisation of the EU. In this context, the EU's social structures are transformed at a speed that is unmatched by any situation at national levels. Gradually, transparency has become a high stake in an inter-institutional battle on oversight and a public right to know which impacts upon the very nature of the Council's operating method.
A break of the deadlock is not to be expected in the short term. In the long run, future change will likely be triggered by supranational actors outside of the Council, rather than intergovernmental actors inside of it. Specifically, two aspects might be of increasing importance in explaining the further development of Council transparency: social structures (such as EP prerogatives, the Lisbon Treaty, and court interpretation of existing provisions) and catalytic events, which are, in these times of economic crisis, highly salient but as of yet difficult to predict.
